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Abstract 
The paper questions how global businesses can alter their attitudes to make them 
more ethical and transparent. It examines three causes of a financial catastrophe that 
are possibly linked to bankers’ attitudes and mindsets: bankers’ excessive greed that 
leads them to fall into ruinous temptations such as securitisation and short-termism, 
bankers’ behavioural limitations such as overconfidence and over optimism and finally 
bankers’ ignorance of financial products. The paper then considers an alternative 
model to confronting bankers’ deficiencies that is more sustainable in the long run: the 
tool of education. When there is so much disapproval of companies for their lack of 
corporate social responsibility, education can help significantly. Its role is three-fold: 
First, it can alert future leaders of the positives of acting selflessly and for socially 
responsible goals. Second, it can teach them of what the law actually says: that they
must promote the company’s best interests – and not the shareholders’ short-term 
interests – a matter frequently ignored within business practice. Finally, via education 
future leaders can learn a thing or two about the behavioural weaknesses often 
characterising people in high executive positions; they can also learn about the risks 
of showing poor judgment and unfamiliarly of a business’ financial nuances and related 
risks. These ‘educational measures’ can help restore integrity back into banking whilst 
underlining the weight of ethics-based corporate cultures.
Keywords  
Bankers, Short-termism, Securitisation, Behavioural Economics, Ignorance, 
Education, Ethics, Regulation, Market.  
1. Introduction 
Not many had foreseen that by the end of the global financial meltdown beginning in 
2008 the economy would have been in such turmoil – a turmoil most observers believe 
to have been the cause of a blend of factors including the under-regulation of new 
financial products, 1  the laissez-faire attitude to investment banking and the 
environment of deregulation that dominated the western world at the time. Since then, 
plenty of academic and governmental studies investigating the crisis’ triggers point to
financial, economic and managerial factors.2 Certainly the highly risky and unsound 
business models are largely to blame; models that resulted in illustrious failures such 
that of Northern Rock, formerly the UK’s eighth largest bank and subsequently 
nationalised, and Fortis Bank, one of Belgium’s largest banks that was eventually split 
into two parts as a result of severe liquidity problems.3 And while banks faced the 
prospect of failure, the world turned against bankers – the self-regarding decision-
makers who appeared comfortable to gamble away their institutions’ money, placing 
little emphasis on risk management or the long run. We saw bankers failing to pursue 
solid business plans or adopt risk management systems to measure, monitor and 
control risks. These were people driven by high profits from high-yielding loans and 
securities, and high-fee income from subprime loans.4
A decade has passed and there is still work to be done. Real improvement has been 
slow despite the vast amounts of new regulation coming through. Some of the newly 
introduced measures may even prove socially regressive, such as the increase of 
shareholder involvement with management through the UK Stewardship Code. Similar 
efforts have taken place in other markets in Europe, such as France and the 
Netherlands. But turning large investors into stewards is admirable in one sense and 
1 Such as different types of securitizations, subprime mortgages and credit default swaps.
2 William C Handorf, ‘Lessons from 2008 US bank failures’ in Laurence E Mitchell and Arthur E Wilmarth, JR. 
(eds), The Panic of 2008 – Causes, Consequences and Implications for Reform (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 
2010) 170.
3 Others would include HBOS, the UK’s largest mortgage lender subsequently rescued by a rival. The UK also 
became the majority owner of two of the country’s top four banks: the Lloyds Banking Group and Royal Bank 
of Scotland (RBS).
4 Take Citibank for example: its yield on real-estate loans increased from 6 per cent in 2005 to 18 per cent by 
2006 at a time when other large banks were reporting yields of 7 per cent on similar loans: William C Handorf, 
‘Lessons from 2008 US bank failures’ in Laurence E Mitchell and Arthur E Wilmarth, JR. (eds), The Panic of 
2008 – Causes, Consequences and Implications for Reform (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2010) 174.
risky in another; the type of stewardship engagement such Codes attempt to promote 
cannot work in practice due to a number of structural limitations faced by investors.5
Shareholders do not possess a great degree of control over long-term plans or the 
day-to-day matters; it is not their role to micromanage or ‘nit-pick’ management. That 
is because the dispersed ownership model relies on the appointment and performance 
of high quality directors who enjoy significant autonomy in the exercise of their 
functions without the need for thorough supervision by owners.6 That said, we have 
not seen many ‘high quality’ bankers openly talking about their moral and professional 
past failings and future moral and professional responsibilities. We have not seen 
much deliberation by them. Their usual defense is that due to the pre-crisis economic 
conditions they were acting as best as they could – the primary goal being the chasing 
of profit. Within this atmosphere there was little questioning on the level of risk bankers 
were taking. Little questioning on the ‘whys’ – why would these people assume such 
excessive risks? Why were they not disturbed by the severe consequences of their 
actions upon the whole financial system?
In one sense, the main ambition of capitalism is the pursuit of profit, and bankers were 
given every incentive and opportunity to do just that. But the capitalistic pursuit of 
money is not enough to justify bankers’ actions, particularly the type of excesses that 
dominated the majority of banking institutions.7 The 2008 global crisis was the worst 
economic disaster since the 1929 Great Depression. The cause has not been located 
to no one single event; instead, it happened because of a number of events, each with 
its own activating device that put together, resulted in the near ruin of the banking 
system.8 A plethora of theories spawned on the crisis’ origins and extent; numerous 
5 Paul L Davies, ‘Institutional Investors: A UK View’ [1991] 57 Brooklyn Law Review 129, 140; Demetra 
Arsalidou, Rethinking Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions (Routledge 2015). 
6 David Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities – Final 
Recommendations (London 26 November 2009) <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf> accessed 12 May 2016, 79. 
7 Such as those that were linked with the securitization business.
8 The underlying cause of the global financial crisis was an amalgamation of debt and mortgage-backed assets. 
The immediate cause originated in the US as a result of the high default rates on ‘subprime’ and adjustable rate 
mortgages. The amount of subprime mortgage debt continued to grow into the early 2000s, around the same 
time the Federal Reserve Board began to reduce interest rates considerably to avoid a recession. A growth in 
loan incentives and a long-term trend of house prices rising incentivised borrowers to accept mortgages they 
would not ordinarily accept, on the expectation that they would obtain more favourable terms in future. 
However, the increase of the interest rates in 2006 and the (noteworthy) drop in housing prices resulted in 
refinancing becoming more difficult. As housing prices fell, subprime borrowers began to default on loans that 
were worth more than their homes, and this accelerated the decline in house prices. Consequently, there was a 
steep rise in defaults and force closure activity. When investors tried to unload the subprime mortgages they 
and diverse as they were9, the causes were also probably closely linked to the 
behaviour of bankers. According to behavioural decision theory the global financial 
crisis is, to a large degree connected to behavioural limitations and socio-
psychological factors.10 In fact, numerous post-crisis reports point to the fact that 
plenty of corporate boards in Europe, the US and elsewhere were characterised by 
incompetence, greed and hubris. Bankers’ excessive greed led them to fall into the 
temptation of securitisation. Their weak professional and ethical responsibility offset 
their predisposition towards self-indulgence and excess. It also led them to think short-
term. Many appeared ignorant of financial products. All the while they were acting in 
an environment that was ‘rich in over-confidence, over-optimism and the stifling of 
contrary opinions’.11
This paper does not provide a full account of the financial crisis’ causes - these have 
been deliberated greatly in literature. Rather, it questions how global businesses can 
alter their attitudes (that saw them placing the short-term share price above everything 
else) to make them more ethical and transparent. We need to question what went 
purchased, there were no buyers in the market. This created a series of subprime lender failures – this in turn, 
caused a liquidity contagion that climbed all the way up in the banking world. Lehman Brothers and Bear 
Stearns, two large investment banks collapsed as a result of their close contact to the subprime debt with many 
others failing later on, not only in the US but in Europe and around the world too. More would have failed had it 
not been for governments in the US, Europe and the UK stepping in to save these banks with taxpayer’s money. 
9 Although corporate governance deficiencies played an important role in this regard, it is crucial to emphasise 
that it is far from certain that they were the main instigates of the financial crisis - in fact, there are empirical 
works that give evidence to the contrary, pointing to that this latest crisis’ most important precipitating factor 
was monetary policy: Allen N. Berger, Christa H.S. Bouwman,‘Bank Liquidity Creation, Monetary Policy, and 
Financial Crises’ [2010]
<http://web.mit.edu/cbouwman/www/downloads/BergerBouwmanFinCrisesMonPolicyAndBankLiqCreation.pd
f> accessed 06 July 2017. Also See, Simon Deakin, ‘Corporate Governance and Financial Crisis in The Long 
Run’ (Working Paper No. 417 Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, December 2010). In 
addition, the lack of ‘trust’ in the activities of banks is also a huge factor here. As Ramskogler notes, ‘as soon as 
trust in the underlying assets started to erode, the fragile structure imploded. As a matter of fact, the creation of 
deposit equivalents outside the realm of deposit insurance and the lack of a lender of last resort led to a new 
version of a classic 19th century bank run. The effects of these ruptures are still felt today’: Paul Ramskogler, 
‘Tracing the Origins of the Financial Crisis’ [2015] OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/fmt-2014-5js3dqmsl4br> accessed 16 June 2017.  
10 For an excellent analysis see Emilios Avgouleas, ‘The Global Financial Crisis and the Disclosure Paradigm in 
European Financial Regulation: The Case for Reform’ [2009] 6(4) European Company and Financial Law 
Review 440. 
11 This is according to the UK’s Treasury Select Committee: House of Commons, Treasury Committee,. 
Banking Crisis: Dealing with the Failure of the UK Bank. (HC 416, Seventh Report of Session 2008-09) - 
Report, Together with Formal Minutes London: TSO (The Stationery Office), p. 3. Also the OECD, in its report 
on the financial crisis, concluded that to an important extent, the crisis was caused by failures and weaknesses in 
corporate governance arrangements which did not serve their purpose to safeguard against excessive risk taking: 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, 
The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis. (1995-2864, Prepared by G. Kirkpatrick – 2009). 
wrong in the banks themselves, whether in Europe, the UK or the US; this will be 
substantiated in the paper by referring to three possible causes of a financial 
catastrophe that are linked to bankers’ attitudes and mindsets: bankers’ excessive 
greed that leads them to fall into ruinous temptations such as securitisation and short-
termism, their behavioural limitations such as overconfidence and over optimism, and 
finally their ignorance and obliviousness of financial nuances and related risks. Next, 
the paper considers an alternative model to confronting bankers’ deficiencies that is 
more sustainable in the long run: the tool of education. When there is so much 
disapproval of companies for their lack of corporate social responsibility, education
can help significantly. The role of education is three-fold. First, it can alert future 
leaders on the positives of acting selflessly and for socially responsible goals; this will 
help restore integrity back into banking whilst underlining the power of ethics-based 
corporate cultures. Second, current and future leaders need to attain a better 
understanding of what the law actually says: that they must promote the company’s 
best interests – and not the shareholders’ short-term interests – a matter frequently 
ignored within business practice. Last but not least, via education leaders can be 
taught that they are prone to behavioural weaknesses and that they also tend to exhibit 
ignorance of financial nuances and related risks, both of which can have catastrophic 
consequences on the financial world as a whole; such an insight can help them 
prepare themselves better for the temptations faced when performing managerial 
tasks of such great magnitude. All in all these ‘educational measures’ led from the 
bottom to the top, are mundane and straightforward. But simplifying our solutions, and 
a dose of common sense can go a long way to tackle the anomalies with respect to 
bankers’ attitudes. Whatever we do, we must do so in order to reinstate confidence in 
and respect for the banks - not the easiest of tasks, and a journey up a steep mountain 
no doubt.
2. Managing a Large Bank in the Globalised World: Europe, the UK and the US 
Banking institutions within Europe, the UK the US come in different shapes and sizes, 
and develop and contract along numerous magnitudes. Yet, a common trait amongst 
them is that banks are corporations, and the enabling rules for their composition, 
management and financing are relatively flexible. But what does it really mean to 
manage a large bank? To provide some context it is necessary to run an investigative 
analysis of the two dominant types of banks of the western world: commercial banks 
and investment banks. These two distinct divisions of the banking industry provide 
largely different services – a distinction that has come under scrutiny since the 
financial crisis’ emergence, with many experts suggesting their functions must be 
reassessed and the roles reconsidered.12 From this perspective there are two key 
temptations linked to modern banking: securitisation and short-termism. Partly 
accountable for the crisis of 2008 and completely unlike traditional banking, these
temptations help design a corporate culture that is dysfunctional and simply flawed, 
whether in a small or large country.13
2.1. Commercial Banks and Investment Banks 
The functions of a commercial bank are typically straightforward especially compared 
to those of an investment bank. Commercial banks are involved with deposit taking 
and making loans - in effect they act as managers for deposit accounts for businesses 
and individuals. They tend to concentrate on business accounts and make public loans 
through deposit money held by them. On the other side are investment banks; these 
are more complex organisations, their main business being securities underwriting, 
M&A advisory, asset management and securities trading. 14 Investment banks
advance the acquisition and sale of bonds, stocks and other investments, and also 
help companies make initial public offerings. Typically their clients include pension 
funds, corporations, governments and hedge funds. Certainly for such banks size 
matters: the larger their size, the more numerous and worldwide are their clients.  Also, 
12 There is plenty of interesting scholarly literature on this, such as John Armour, Daniel Awrey, Paul Lyndon 
Davies, Luca Enriques, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Colin P. Mayer, Jennifer Payne, Principles of Financial Regulation
(Oxford University Press 2016); Gerard Caprio (ed), Handbook of Safeguarding Global Financial 
Stability: Political, Social, Cultural, and Economic Theories and Models (Elsevier 2012).
13 Indeed, the global financial crisis is a harsh reminder of the multi-layered nature of crises. They hit small, 
large, poor and rich countries equally. As Reinhart and Rogoff write,‘financial crises are an equal opportunity 
menace’: Karmen M. Reinhard and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial 
Folly (Princeton Press 2009).
14 The world’s top investment banks are: Barclays, BofA Merrill Lynch, Warburgs, Goldman Sachs, Deutsche 
Bank, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Salomon Brothers, UBS, Credit Suisse, Citibank and Lazard. In the vicinity 
of London investment banks can be divided into three key categories: a) the US banks such as Citigroup, JP 
Morgan, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, b) the EU and UK banks, such as Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank 
and UBS and c) the specialist independent investment banks, such as Lazard and Rothschild.
the more their connections within the market, and this means the higher their chances 
of profiting through the matching of buyers and sellers, especially for transactions that 
are particularly unique in nature. This gives them a great degree of international 
significance. In relation to functions and activities, compared to commercial banks 
investment banks are more multifaceted in nature. Normally investment bankers 
identify new business opportunities, conduct thorough research into market conditions 
and trends, collaborate with finance executives of other organisations, and work 
alongside numerous teams of professionals such as accountants and lawyers. They 
usually carry out financial modelling in order to create and present to the clients 
suitable financial solutions. Corporate investment bankers tend to work in teams, each 
team engaged in specific transactions or specific market sectors. More specifically, 
their functions consist of two key parts: origination and execution. Origination refers to 
the assessment of a deal’s desirability, a task that requires the use of complicated 
financial models to calculate possible outcomes (if it is to be done right). It also requires 
a thorough and in-depth appreciation of the particular sector or sectors under 
consideration. Execution refers to the structuring and negotiation of a deal’s complex 
terms. Even though origination and execution are distinct, the teams assigned each 
task have to work closely with one another during each phase. This helps them benefit 
from relevant market intelligence and expert information.  
In so far as qualifications go, standards are high. Candidates everyone and particularly 
in the continents of Europe and America, must hold a strong academic performance 
in order to stand a realistic chance of a career in the investment-banking sector. 
Discipline-wise investment banks tend to employ graduates from a range of sectors 
and not just those whose degrees are finance-focused, although typically successful 
candidates are former financial advisers, traders or even salespersons. Certainly (the 
generously-rewarded) investment bankers come from a variety of backgrounds but a 
strong foundation in mathematics is advantageous: not only it helps them get a job in 
the banking sector, a maths background can prove useful once in the job itself. In 
addition, an MBA degree is an extremely beneficial qualification to take as it enhances
a candidate’s chances considerably; graduates of MBA programs have significantly
higher chances of gaining and retaining a high-level management post. In fact, it is 
estimated that approximately seventy percent of the MBA holders worldwide are senior 
managers, board directors and investment bankers.15 Unquestionably without a good 
degree entry to the investment-banking sector is highly unlikely.
2.2. Job Temptations linked to Modern Banking Practices: Securitisation and 
Short-Termism 
Orthodox financial economics examines the way individuals and institutions make 
decisions under uncertainty. This discipline disapproves of legal constraints; in place 
of the legal status quo it opts for a deregulatory normative agenda.16 That is because 
of the traditional economic assumption that people behave rationally and with logical, 
clear thought. Rational actors do not gamble away their institutions money unless the 
expected rewards overshadow the possibility of losses occurring in future – in other 
words, if the eventual benefits are, on balance, worth their while. The assumption that 
individuals make rational economic decisions has gone largely unchallenged partly 
because of its convenient nature (at least until recently that is). It has certainly aided 
economic theorists make meaningful contributions about individual behaviour; it has 
given self-regulation space to flourish and dominate, and has also helped develop the 
idea that bankers do not need their behaviour to be ‘controlled’: they are sufficiently 
rational in their actions and perfectly cognizant of their choices’ risks and returns.17
But often, this is not so. The job of the investment banker is full of temptations. The 
pressure to reach annual goals together with the regular incrementing of those goals 
being reliant on performance evidently motivates bankers to use inappropriate 
methods to ‘fulfil’ their roles. From this perspective, there are currently two key 
problems with modern banking: securitisation and short-termism. These two, partly 
accountable for the financial crisis of 2008, are completely unlike traditional banking. 
Traditional banking expects banks to base loan decisions on a personal acquaintance 
and long-term relationship held with the borrower. This is in contrast to ‘securitization’: 
in fact, the phenomenon of securitization perfectly embodies what can go wrong with 
15 Maria Alexandra Bujor, ‘5 Good Reasons to Do an MBA’ <http://www.mastersportal.eu/articles/340/5-very-
good-reasons-to-do-an-mba.html> accessed 09 May 2016.
16 Donald C Langevoort, ‘Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law’ in Claire A Hill and Brett H McDonnell 
(eds), Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 3.
17 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Regulation and Failure’ in David Moss and John Cisternino (eds), New Perspectives on 
Regulation (The Tobin Project 2009) 16.
modern banking; personal relationships and community interests diverging to a 
notable degree. There is no personal relationship between the lender and the 
borrower; rather, the relationship is symbolised by a hands-off approach with short-
term results as the main aim. The affiliation between the two parties is characterised 
by anonymity and trust plays no role in a relationships’ formation. 18 But exactly 
happens during the securitisation process? The term ‘securitization’ is defined as “the
increased use of the securities markets for the extension of credit and in particular to 
the specific procedure for dedicating the interest and the principal payments from a 
specific pool of loans to the issuance of securities”.19 During securitization there is an 
eruption in the use of complicated and obscure derivative products. Certainly the
housing bubble of 2007 provided the ideal conditions for securitization to flourish: in 
the years before the crisis’ climax we saw the sale and promotion of exotic mortgages 
to millions of individuals who were completely unaware of the implications of this
practice.20 Investment banks would purchase the mortgages, repackage them and 
then sell them to numerous investors worldwide, largely pension funds and non-profit 
organisations.21 Banks used securitization to package subprime loans into ambiguous 
derivative products that were later on sold to financial institutions in the shadow 
banking system, thereby creating the perfect platform for a full-blown economic 
catastrophe.
Still, securitization is not illegal; the crucial question therefore, is whether bankers 
understand exactly the complexities and repercussions of this method. In the financial 
catastrophe of 2008 banks’ risk assessment in places like the US, the UK and Europe 
more widely, was poor; banks would routinely fail to inspect the credit history, financial 
security or income of borrowers. Subprime loans were passed on to the secondary 
loan market within months after initiation, with little risk to banks: the risk was passed 
on to the parties that purchased the secured mortgages. In effect the investors who 
purchased these securities were basically lending money to homeowners with little or 
18 But as Ramskogler notes, as soon as trust in the underlying assets starts to erode, the fragile structure 
implodes: Paul Ramskogler, ‘Tracing the Origins of the Financial Crisis’ [2015] OECD Journal: Financial 
Market Trends <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/fmt-2014-5js3dqmsl4br> accessed 16 June 2017. 
19 Martin H Wolfson and Gerald A Epstein (eds), The Handbook of the Political Economy of Financial Crises
(OUP 2013) 35.20 Viral Acharya, Phillip Schnabl and Gustavo Suarez, ‘Securitization Without Risk Transfer’ [2013] 107 Journal 
of Financial Economics 515.
21 This repackaging is, in fact, a very crucial step in the method of securitization.
no knowledge of the homeowners’ identity; rather, they expected the banks that sold 
them the products to perform a thorough identity check. But this was not always so; 
banks had little or no motivation to do so. Banks were only concerned with getting rid 
of the mortgage-backed securities as quickly as possible.
Equally destructive, particularly amongst European, UK and US banks, is the practice 
of ‘short-termism’. Directors are expected to promote “sustainable value” in order to 
benefit all stakeholders, and that should include the local community in which the 
company functions and operates.22 But because institutions invest in order to receive 
a financial return directors tend to forget that they are not to solely promote immediate 
financial interests – at least not by law. This is worsened by the fact that if any 
instructions are given to fund managers they are generally “on the basis of high, 
medium or low financial risk and not on the basis of sustainable growth, social capital 
or how a company promotes relational operations”.23 Although the cause of the crisis 
has not been located to no one single event24 large numbers of commentators as well 
as numerous post-financial crisis research reports maintain that over-leverage and 
excessive risk-taking were the underlying reasons for the crisis, and this was 
principally due to pressures from shareholders to focus on quarterly earnings. 25
22 Arad Reisberg, 'The Notion of Stewardship from a Company Law Perspective: Re-defined and Re-assessed in 
Light of the Recent Financial Crisis?' [2011] 18 Journal of Financial Crime 126, 135.  
23 Arad Reisberg, 'The Notion of Stewardship from a Company Law Perspective: Re-defined and Re-assessed in 
Light of the Recent Financial Crisis?' [2011] 18 Journal of Financial Crime 126, 134.  
24 The global economic crisis happened because of a number of events, each with its own activating device that 
together, caused the near ruin of the banking system. As noted in the introduction to this paper, the underlying 
cause was the amalgamation of debt and mortgage-backed assets. The immediate cause originated in the US as a 
result of the high default rates on ‘subprime’ and adjustable rate mortgages. It is also crucial to note that 
although corporate governance deficiencies contributed to the crisis, it is far from certain that they were the 
main instigates of the financial crisis - in fact, there appear to be empirical works that give evidence to the 
contrary. There is empirical evidence that points to that the 2008 crisis’ precipitating factor was monetary 
policy:  Allen N. Berger, Christa H.S. Bouwman,‘Bank Liquidity Creation, Monetary Policy, and Financial 
Crises’ [2010]
<http://web.mit.edu/cbouwman/www/downloads/BergerBouwmanFinCrisesMonPolicyAndBankLiqCreation.pd
f> accessed 06 July 2017. Also See, Simon Deakin, ‘Corporate Governance and Financial Crisis in The Long 
Run’ (Working Paper No. 417 Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, December 2010). In 
addition, the lack of ‘trust’ in the activities of banks is also a huge factor here. As Ramskogler notes, ‘as soon as 
trust in the underlying assets started to erode, the fragile structure imploded. As a matter of fact, the creation of 
deposit equivalents outside the realm of deposit insurance and the lack of a lender of last resort led to a new 
version of a classic 19th century bank run. The effects of these ruptures are still felt today’: Paul Ramskogler, 
‘Tracing the Origins of the Financial Crisis’ [2015] OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/fmt-2014-5js3dqmsl4br> accessed 16 June 2017.  
25 Andrew Keay, ‘The Global Financial Crisis: Risk, Shareholder Pressure and Short-Termism in Financial 
Institutions’ (Working Paper Centre for Business Law and Practice, School of Law, University of Leeds, August 
2010) < http://www.law.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/events/directors-duties/keay-the-duty-to-promote-the-
success.pdf> accessed 16 April 2016, 30; Michael Lipton, Timothy Mirvis and Jay Lorsch, ‘The Proposed 
Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009’ [2009] Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and 
Walker has even suggested that bankers’ short-term behaviour was the financial crisis’ 
catalyst. 26 According to Blundell-Wignall et al., over the past decades, the 
opportunities to increase leverage in the financial sectors of many industrialized
economies rose to a large extent, a crucial reason being the excess liquidity caused 
by the factors such as reserve accumulation and low policy rates.27 It is thought that 
the search for immediate monetary gratification at the expense of future returns has 
driven investors and directors for years. 28 The fundamental problem lies in the 
theoretical basis of the short-term approach: the manager, as agent, is motivated to 
act for the shareholder who is constantly pushing for short-term profits. But directors
can also benefit from short-termism; it is a form of enlightened self-interest because 
executive remuneration is often linked to the making of a quick profit. Yet, short-
termism has long-term disbenefits and costs and is a guaranteed way to destroy 
company value. 29 Rather than pushing for real meaningful progress, managers 
constantly chase quick solutions that ultimately fail to benefit the company or the 
shareholders long-term. Take the US system for example: although it has enjoyed 
great prominence for a long time, its ‘traditional’ practices proved inadequate in recent 
years.30 Despite the plethora of positives, the system encourages excessive risk-
taking and short-sighted behaviour with little concern as to the consequences of short-
Financial Regulation < http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/05/12/the-proposed-
%E2%80%9Cshareholder-bill-of-rights-act-of-2009%E2%80%9D/> accessed 16 May 2016; Alessio M Pacces, 
‘Consequences of Uncertainty for Regulation: Law and Economics of the Financial Crisis’ [2010] 4 European 
Company and Financial Law Review, 479; Andrea S Ginevri, ‘The Rise of the Long-Term Minority 
Shareholders’ Rights in Publicly Held Corporations and its Effect on Corporate Governance’ [2011] 12 
European Business Organisation Law Review 587. 
26 David Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities –
Final Recommendations (London 26 November 2009) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf> 
accessed 12 May 2016, 75. 27 Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Paul Atkinson and Se Hoo Lee, ‘The Current Financial Crisis: Causes and Policy 
Issues’ [2009] 2008/2 OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/fmt-v2008-art10-en> 
accessed 20 August 2017. Also see Alberto Manconi, Masimo Massa and Ayako Yasuda, The Role of 
Institutional Investors in Propagating the Crisis of 2007-2008’ [2012] 104 Journal of Financial Economics 491. 
28 This is according to the Kay review: The Kay Review, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term 
Decision Making Interim Report (Pub Ref: URN 12/631, Feb 2012) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31544/12-631-kay-review-of-
equity-markets-interim-report.pdf > accessed 22 April 2016.  
29 Andrea S Ginevri, ‘The Rise of the Long-Term Minority Shareholders’ Rights in Publicly Held Corporations 
and its Effect on Corporate Governance’ [2011] 12 European Business Organisation Law Review 587, 602; 
Demetra Arsalidou, ‘Shareholders and Corporate Scrutiny: the Role of the UK Stewardship Code’ [2012] 9(3) 
European Company and Financial Law Review 342. 
30 Monks suggests that there has been little progress in recent years and that it can no longer be seen as a successful 
system despite all the effort put into its improvement, particularly during the 1990’s: Robert AG Monks, 
‘Corporate Governance - the Wrong Way and the Right Way’ [2005] 13 Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 108. 
term actions. The 2001 Enron collapse for instance, one of the darlings of post 1980’s 
American corporate law, happened despite the clever features of the US system. The
compensation and performance management systems of both Lehman and Enron,31
designed to retain and motivate the most valued employees, had cash flows that 
noticeably exceeded the value of the executives’ initial holdings.32 All these helped 
design a dysfunctional corporate culture that became too fixated with short-term 
earnings to enhance bonuses.33
3. Bankers’ Imperfections and their Link to Financial Catastrophes in Europe, 
UK, and the US 
A number of concerns stem from the above. Above all, it is obvious that running an 
investment bank is a particularly complex job; a plethora of skills, knowledge and 
experience is what is needed to do the job right. Intriguingly what often lies behind the 
formation of a multifaceted business structure is the desire to reduce or eradicate 
altogether potential liability for any wrongful acts inflicted on others by the firm itself.34
Whatever the underlying reasons, the question after formation is whether those 
employed to manage large institutions in Europe, America or elsewhere (such as 
investment banks) are capable of properly undertaking and fulfilling their obligations, 
thereby circumventing potential liability for breach of duty. Ultimately, investment 
banks are not known for their focus on training; in fact it is typical for a banker's career 
development and training to take a backseat – after all, they are expected to work, not
learn.35 This means their pre-existing qualifications are key. Therefore, it is crucial to 
ask: do they have the qualifications needed? Do they understand the complexities of 
the tasks they are bound to face once in the job itself? 
Operating at a fairly high level of abstraction, the fundamental question is why bankers 
behave the way they do. Essentially many things can go wrong; bankers’ 
31 As well as numerous other firms, notably Bear Stearns.
32 Lucian A Bebchuck, Alma Cohen, Holger Spamann, ‘The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear 
Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008’ [2010] 27 Yale Journal on Regulation 257. 
33 Bethany McLean and Peter Bethany, The Smartest Guys in the Room (Portfolio Trade 2004) 241. It is 
astonishing that the top 200 highest-paid employees of Enron received $193 million from salaries, bonuses, and 
stock in 1998, and by 2000 the amount increased to $1.4 billion.
34 Eric W Orts, Business Persons – A Legal Theory of the Firm (Oxford University Press 2013) 192.
35 Andrew Gutmann, How to Be an Investment Banker: Recruiting, Interviewing, and Landing the Job (Wiley 
2015). 
understanding of their products’ complexities can be weak, their behaviour can be 
subject to serious limitations that prevent the proper performance of their roles and 
functions, and last but not least, any self-centred job ‘strategies’ can seriously harm 
rather than benefit institutions. But answers are not that easy; for example, if we take 
the issue of securitization, how to deal with this type of business is a question that 
raises serious difficulties. What can be done about this tempting management style? 
From a finance / regulatory perspective there are measures that could prove effective, 
such as more regulation during the stages leading to the restructuring stage.36 As 
Stiglitz opines, having provisions to deal with a well-organized payment method would
be a strong second measure; this would involve a system “in which the bank facilitates 
transactions, transferring its depositors’ money to those from whom they buy goods 
and services), and the assessment and management of risk and making loans”. The 
second core function is linked to the first, in the sense that “if a bank makes poor credit 
assessments, or if it puts too much money into risky ventures that default, it can no 
longer make good on its promises to return depositors’ money.”37
Clearly, mismanaging capital is not good for either side – firms and bankers on the 
one side, society on the other. It is also true that the incentive structures of the financial 
market system need restructuring; in order for the restructuring to work however, other 
things have to happen first. But before we deliberate on what can be done about 
bankers’ temptations and deficiencies, we need to understand why bankers behave 
the way they do.  
3.1. Behavioural Causes and Instigates 
Banks, and especially the bankers who represent them, have tendencies towards 
clashing objectives, muddled internal incentives and ineffective oversight. 38 But why 
do they even display these characteristics? Why do bankers continuously fall into the 
same pattern of underestimating the risks associated with managing large institutions? 
36 Joseph Stiglitz, Freefall – America, Free Markets and the Sinking of the World Economy (Tantor Media 
2010), 22.
37 Joseph Stiglitz, Freefall – America, Free Markets and the Sinking of the World Economy (Tantor Media 
2010), 22.
38 A. Michael Froomkin, ‘Reinventing the Government Corporation’ [1995] University of Illinois Law Review 
543, 618-633.
Although questions remain about which part of the financial system failed most cruelly, 
most observers agree that behavioural factors performed a central part in the failures 
of British, European and American banks in 2008.39 Certainly, understanding with 
precision why bankers act the way they do is vital in this debate. Due to the weakness 
of ownership and control, bankers are able to engage in forms of behaviour that do 
not advance company wealth and that are unproductive from the perspective of both 
institutions and societies alike.40  Some argue self-interest is the reason for this, 
because reckless risks can (and frequently do) result in a personal benefit to the one 
assuming the risk. Still, self-interest alone cannot be the sole driving force of this kind 
of behaviour; it is too simplistic as a justification. By undervaluing the risks involved 
bankers risk their own positions and reputations: personal liability, job losses or even 
imprisonment are very likely consequence. There are other, more complex 
behavioural causes that can be deliberated upon that offer more convincing 
explanations as to the reasons bankers behave the way they do.41
To begin with, noteworthy perspectives are provided by the prospect theory: this is a 
behavioural economic theory that offers some intriguing insights into the behaviour of 
bankers. Developed through Kahmenan and Tversky’s ground-breaking research into 
the motives of market participants, prospect theory considers the way people manage 
risks under uncertainty. It offers two notable explanations of market participants’ 
behaviour: people’s tendency to seek risk at times when losses are highly likely, and 
people’s tendency to be risk-averse in situations where a gain is possible. Through 
laboratory experiments prospect theory identifies the key reasons irresponsibility is 
triggered. Market participants make decisions based on the potential value of losses 
39 Alan S. Blinder, Andrew W. Lo, Robert M. Solow, Rethinking the Financial Crisis (Russell Sage Foundation 
2012); Robert E. Grosse, The Global Financial Crisis – A Behavioral View (Thunderbird School of Global 
Management 2010). For a study of behavioural factors more generally see: David Sharfstein and Jeremy Stein, 
‘Herd Behavior and Investment’ [1990] 80(3) American Economic Review 465;  Dale Griffin and Amos 
Tversky ‘The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Overconfidence’ [1992] 24 Cognitive Psychology 
411; Abhijit Banerjee, ‘A Simple Model of Herd Behavior’ [1992] 107 Quarterly Journal of Economics 797.
40 John E Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (Clarendon Press 1993) 63.
41 By way of background, the methodological assumptions of orthodox financial economics, i.e. that of 
individual rationality and market efficiency, came to be challenged largely with the seminar work of Kahneman 
and Tversky and continued through a scholarship revolution in the 1990’s. Kahneman and Tversky, who 
received a Nobel Prize in economics in 2002, analysed the host of irrationalities that characterise individuals in 
economic settings, and helped the development of a subfield of economics called behavioural economics. See 
Daniel Kahneman, ‘Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics’ [2003] 93 American 
Economic Review 1449; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘On the Psychology of Prediction’ [1973] 80 
Psychological Review 237.
and gains rather than on the most likely (and final) outcome, and they assess these 
losses and gains using ‘heuristics’.42 Heuristics are mental shortcuts or rules of thumb 
used to simplify (or even oversimplify) decisions taken under uncertainty.43 Decision-
makers who are convinced of their institutions’ imminent breakdown tend to take 
remarkably high risks to avoid a loss. They opt for risky routes in order to side step the 
negative consequences of their own reckless actions.44 The Barings bank is a classic 
illustration of this type of behaviour: once a reputable financial institution, it collapsed 
due to the actions of its floor trading manager, Nick Leeson. Leeson made a number 
of unauthorized speculative trades that proved highly profitable for the bank at first, 
but with the passage of time caused Barings severe damage. In his attempt to recoup 
his losses and retrieve the amounts already lost, Leeson started taking even higher
risks. He showed no hesitation in doing so because the quantum of loss far exceeded 
his relative risk threshold.45
In addition, empirical psychology literature offers some interesting perspectives on the 
tendency of bankers to assume reckless risks. Insights from behavioural economics, 
cognitive psychology and neuroscience provide a different approach to management 
motivation from that deliberated so far. Behavioural psychology considers the 
underlying factors of reckless economic behaviour; according to various studies 
individuals are subject to cognitive errors or cognitive biases and information 
asymmetries. Bankers are predisposed to numerous behavioural biases that influence 
their ability to act rationally.46 Psychologists explain these cognitive errors, collectively 
42 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: an Analysis of Decision under Risk’ [1979] 47 
Econometrica, 263. Daniel Kahneman, won a Nobel Prize in Economics for his work developing Prospect 
theory. Also, see S Trevis Certo, Brian L Connelly and Laszlo Tihanyi, ‘Managers and Their Not-So Rational 
Decisions’ [2008] 51 Business Horizons 113.
43 For a discussion on ‘heuristics’ see: Demetra Arsalidou, ‘Institutional Investors, Behavioural Economics and 
the Concept of Stewardship’ [2012] 6(6) Law and Financial Markets Review 410; Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: an Analysis of Decision under Risk’ [1979] 47 Econometrica, 263; Amos Tversky 
and Daniel Kahneman, ‘On the Psychology of Prediction’ [1973] 80 Psychological Review 237. Also, see 
Emilios Avgouleas, ‘The Global Financial Crisis and the Disclosure Paradigm in European Financial 
Regulation: The Case for Reform’ [2009] 6(4) European Company and Financial Law Review 440.
44 Also, see: Richard H Thaler, ‘Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice’ [1980] 1 Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 39; Jonathan Mercer, ‘Prospect Theory and Political Science’ [2005] 8 Annual 
Review of Political Science 21: Mercer lists several examples of the loss aversion bias from political science; 
Terrance Odean, ‘Are Investors Reluctant to Realize their Losses?’ [1998] 53 Journal of Finance 1775: Odean 
describes the practical implications of loss aversion. 
45 Jeffrey Delmon, Project Finance, BOT Projects and Risk (Kluwer Law International 2005) 22.
46 Jonathan Macey, Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken (Princeton University Press 2008) 
69. See also Charles P Kindleberger and Robert Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of the Financial 
known as confirmation biases, by looking at several factors such as emotional and 
cultural factors; studies suggest that embarrassment, persistence and hope may incite 
cognitive errors, whereas superstition and tradition may aggravate the cultural forces 
behind one’s behaviour. Emotions and instincts play a key part in the decision-making 
process,47 resulting in herd effects and irrational momentum swings. Crucially over-
optimism and confirmation bias are key ingredients in analysing economic behaviour. 
People tend to display overconfidence in their own abilities and prefer not to search 
for evidence that can potentially contradict their pre-set ideas. In fact, any evidence 
opposing their assumptions tends to be ignored. Excessive pride and self-confidence 
collectively known as hubris are also common characteristics of market participants. 
Undoubtedly the behaviour of many during the 2008 financial catastrophe pointed to 
signs of overconfidence and even arrogance, traits that contributed to the 
misjudgements that were made at the time. These are complex and multifaceted 
issues; what can be said with certainty is that behavioural biases can produce very 
distinctive dynamics within corporations. 
Nevertheless, there are many prominent critics who doubt the value of behavioural 
economics.48 That firms have institutional incentives to de-bias is critical to the general 
objections of this field. Importantly it would have to be shown that the alleged bias is 
a commonly occurring phenomenon in the general population and not a mere artefact 
of experimental design. The institutional environment in which these decisions are 
made plays a crucial role too: this environment would need to contain no ‘de biasing’ 
constraints such as peer review, off-setting contractual incentives and external 
monitoring. But it would be hard to assess such factors. Chief executive officers and 
Crises (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons 2005): interestingly, in this book it is argued that irrational behaviour is 
what links the different financial disasters that have occurred in the markets.  
47 Emilios Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial Markets – the Law, the Economics, the Politics
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 121.
48 See Richard Posner, ‘Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the Law’ [1998] 50 Stanford Law Review 
1551; Roberta Romano, ‘A Comment on Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions and their Implications for 
Public Policy’ [1986] 59 Southern California Law Review 313; Donald C Langevoort, ‘Behavioral Approaches 
to Corporate Law’ in Claire A Hill and Brett H McDonnell (eds), Research Handbook on the Economics of 
Corporate Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 3. It should be noted that there is inadequate empirical data to construe an 
empirically confirmable theory on incentives. Behavioural scientists need to devote more time researching 
bankers’ behaviour- we need a better appreciation of the strategies used by market participants and especially 
bankers. What strategies do they use and how are their decisions actually made? It is crucial we learn more 
about crowd psychology and the impact of heuristics, and in particular the impact on heuristics on bank 
directors. For an interesting discussion see: Kath Hall, ‘Looking Beneath the Surface: the Impact of Psychology 
on Corporate Decision Making’ [2007] 49 Managerial Law 93, 105.
board members are not accidentally selected; they are survivors of high-pressure 
employment and promotion tournaments.49 The presence of irrational biases cannot 
be presumed since it cannot be shown with certainty that they can survive such 
tournaments. Yet still, the behavioural insight is important and the idea that cognitive 
biases exist is by no means unreasonable. Cognitive biases are adaptable and can 
survive competitive settings; for instance the bias of overconfidence can be highly 
adaptive and therefore it is reasonable to expect some directors to exhibit this trait in 
their behaviour. Research suggests that overconfidence and mildly inflated self-
esteem (ego) are associated with higher risk tolerance, excessive ambition, 
persistence and numerous other attributes that come in ‘handy’ in the banking 
environment.50 The overconfident tend to ‘play’ with more aggression, generating 
stronger outcomes, both positive and negative. At the next round those lucky enough 
to experience the positive results have the confidence to play even harder. If there are 
enough players around, there will be the fortunate few who are rewarded more 
frequently than their more ‘conservative’ colleagues, time and time again.51
Moreover, according to behavioural psychology directors’ undue deference and 
submissiveness may not be the result of greater operational efficiency but the product 
of commitment, sunk cost biases and group behaviour.52 According to Langevoort 
directors generally acquiesce, preferring to stay quiet than question a particular course 
of action. Silence can be interpreted as agreement, thereby reinforcing the status quo 
via a kind of social proof.53 There is also the matter of loyalty, a weighty characteristic 
of executive behaviour; in law, the tendency is to focus on the duty of loyalty, imposed 
on directors to prevent a conflict between their self-interest and shareholder wealth. 
49 Donald C Langevoort, ‘Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law’ in Claire A Hill and Brett H McDonnell 
(eds), Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 5.
50 Donald C Langevoort, ‘Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law’ in Claire A Hill and Brett H McDonnell 
(eds), Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 5. Also, see Anand Goel 
and Anjan Thakor, ‘Overconfidence, CEO Selection and Corporate Governance’ [2008] 63 Journal of Finance
2737; Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate ‘CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment’ [2008] 60
Journal of Finance 2661; Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate, ‘Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO 
Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction’ [2008] 89 Journal of Financial Economics 20.
51 Donald C Langevoort, ‘Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law’ in Claire A Hill and Brett H McDonnell 
(eds), Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 5. 
52 Donald C Langevoort, ‘Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law’ in Claire A Hill and Brett H McDonnell 
(eds), Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 12.
53 Donald C Langevoort, ‘Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law’ in Claire A Hill and Brett H McDonnell 
(eds), Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 12; M. O’Connor, ‘The 
Enron board: the perils of groupthink’, University of Cincinnati Law Review 71, 2003, 1233–1319. Also, see 
Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (Tavistock Press 1974).
But the loyalty exhibited by directors to other members of the corporate team is also 
of significance - according to studies resilient multi-directional loyalty partly explains 
why bankers act the way they act. Evidently, loyalty strongly influences the behaviour 
of senior executives, with many illustrations of this throughout history. Executives will 
even contentedly lie in order to protect their teams. They will choose to breach their 
loyalty to the firms than be disloyal to the other members of the group; that they are 
risking their reputations, wealth and even freedom is not a reason for them not to act 
so. They would rather suffer in the name of ‘team spirit’ and as Langeroort continues, 
this resilient multi-directional loyalty is the reason why some prefer not to blow the 
whistle. They choose to continue with the deception than harm the firm’s ‘insiders’, 
and this at their own personal risk.54 In fact, this goes both ways: boards of directors 
are loyal to the management teams they appoint and management teams are loyal to 
their boards. For example, the Chief Executive Officer of Enron chose not to blow the 
whistle upon discovering the fraud, despite the fact that most of the fraud took place 
during his period of absence from the firm. 55
3.2. Ignorance is (Not) Bliss  
Bankers can have clashing objectives, muddled internal incentives and their oversight 
can be ineffective. 56  Yet all the while they are expected to be well-qualified 
professionals with a first-rate understanding of their bank’s operations – this is how 
their over-generous pay levels are justified (and frequently defended). But apart from 
the aforementioned behavioural traits, what else causes bankers’ performance to
disappoint? What other explanations are there for bankers’ attitudes and behavioural 
characteristics? Bankers’ attributes can be better understood in terms of the 
54 Donald C Langevoort, ‘Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law’ in Claire A Hill and Brett H McDonnell 
(eds), Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 14. See also Jonathan 
Macey, Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken (Princeton University Press 2008) 85.
55 For a well-rounded discussion of behavioural issues, see Herbert A. Simon, ‘A Behavioral Model of Rational 
Choice’, [1955] 69 Quarterly Journal of Economics 69, 99; Herbert A Simon, ‘Rational Choice in the Structure 
of the Environment’ in Herbert A Simon (ed), Models of Man: Social and Rational (John Wiley and Sons 
1957); Cass R Sustein (ed), Behavioural Law and Economics (Cambridge University Press 2000); Daniel 
Kahneman, ‘Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics’ [2003] 93 American 
Economic Review1449; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘On the Psychology of Prediction’ [1973] 80 
Psychological Review 237. 
56 A. Michael Froomkin, ‘Reinventing the Government Corporation’ [1995] University of Illinois Law Review 
543, 618-633.. Interestingly, at least one crucial root cause has been tracked to low credit standards by credit 
rating agencies, which were also widely securitized by investment banks.
ideological orthodoxy that conquered the financial service industry in recent years: 
boards’ failure to understand and manage risk.57 Bank performance disappoints when 
management and boards are incapable or unwilling to recognise, evaluate, oversee 
and control risks in a way that safeguards the safety of their institutions.58 The 2008
crisis uncovered serious flaws in this respect: evidence from numerous European, UK, 
US and international post-crisis enquiries has found that ignorance generally 
embodied the behaviour of many bank executives; put simply, too many people 
appeared incapable of understanding the risks involved.59 According to a report by the 
International Corporate Governance Network, boards tolerated perverse incentives
and showed little understanding of risk management.60 The UK Parliament’s Treasury 
Committee in its report on corporate governance and pay in the City agreed with this 
conclusion. In the US, institutions’ failures were viewed as failures of strategy and risk 
management tasks primarily due to lack of understanding.61 Interesting also are the 
findings of a report by a group of senior supervisors from regulatory agencies: a 
leading factor to the financial breakdown was the boards’ reluctance and / or inability 
to “articulate, measure and adhere to a level of risk acceptable to the firm”.62 As we 
learn, banks such as Fortis Bank in Belgium, Northern Rock in the UK and Lehman 
Brothers in the US have suffered massive losses partly due to their executives’ failure 
to understand the exact nature of the derivatives, which securitised ‘toxic debt’ 
consisting of sub-prime mortgages.63
57 International Corporate Governance Network, Second Statement on the Financial Crisis (March 2009)
<https://www.icgn.org/> accessed 10 April 2016.  
58 William C Handorf, ‘Lessons from 2008 US bank failures’ in Laurence E Mitchell and Arthur E Wilmarth, 
JR. (eds), The Panic of 2008 – Causes, Consequences and Implications for Reform (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Ltd 2010) 170.
59 House of Commons, Treasury Committee, Banking Crisis, Reforming Corporate Governance and Pay in the 
City (HC 519, Ninth Report of Session 2008–09) - Report, Together with Formal Minutes London: TSO (The 
Stationery Office). See also Roman Tomasic, ‘Raising Corporate Governance Standards in Response to 
Corporate Rescue and Insolvency’ [2009] 2 Corporate Rescue and Insolvency 5. 
60 Pauline Skypala, ‘Time to Reward Good Corporate Governance’ Financial Times (London, 17 November 
2008) 6. 
61 Howard Davies, The Financial Crisis: Who is to Blame? (Polity Press 2010) 147. Also see Neil O’Hara, 
‘Asleep at the Switch? Corporate Boards’ Culpability in the 2008 Financial Crisis’ (2012) 2 The Investment 
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62 Senior Supervisors Group reporting to the Financial Stability Board, Bank for International Settlements, Risk 
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Let us be fair here. Banks are complex, opaque organisations and the taking of risk is 
part of their make-up. Bankers however, do not appear to understand the severity of 
the risks they assume on behalf of their banks. Certainly in the financial crisis of 2008 
many derivatives were so complex that even if all the information relating to them had 
been fully disclosed, most bankers would have been unable to appreciate their real 
value.64 Financial models were and still are, polygonal and can change at a fast speed, 
making it hard for executives to appreciate their banks’ products and the reasons for 
doing or not doing something. Originating high-risk loans to high-risk mortgagors or 
purchasing high-risk securities are powerful examples of such distorted risks in 
economic settings.65 The inadequacy of executive knowledge and the general veil of 
ignorance that tends to symbolise behaviour is certainly one key and common 
characteristic of bank crises throughout history. In fact these traits have been around 
for years, with myriads of old and new cases showing ignorance and lack of 
understanding, varying only in degree and severity. 66
Take Re CSTC Ltd67 for example. According to the judge the director was reckless in 
the performance of his duties and totally ‘incompetent’. He had no understanding of 
the company’s operations and no knowledge of how to properly scrutinise the 
accounts or how best to protect the clients’ moneys. He appeared too willing to 
delegate, leaving serious matters in the hands of others without further supervision by 
him, a behaviour largely caused by his failure to comprehend the true complexities of 
his organisation.68 In Re Austinsuite Furniture Ltd69 the director’s poor knowledge of 
his company’s affairs was not treated lightly either: the judge characterised the 
decision to accept a directorship as reckless and unwise, particularly since the director 
lacked the necessary commercial knowledge and experience. In Re Linvale two 
directors were disqualified for five years after three successive companies of which 
they were directors went into insolvency. Although they acted honestly, their ignorance 
64 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Regulation and Failure’ in David Moss and John Cisternino (eds), New Perspectives on 
Regulation (The Tobin Project 2009) 15.
65 William C Handorf, ‘Lessons from 2008 US bank failures’ in Laurence E Mitchell and Arthur E Wilmarth, 
JR. (eds), The Panic of 2008 – Causes, Consequences and Implications for Reform (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Ltd 2010) 174.
66 Such behaviour can typically lead to disqualification on the grounds of unfitness under s 6 of the Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
67 Re CSTC Ltd [1995] BCC 173 (ChD).  
68 Re CSTC Ltd [1995] BCC 173 (ChD), 183. 
69 Re Austinsuite Furniture Ltd [1992] BCLC 1047.
of financial matters ‘in any technical sense’ contributed significantly to the demise of 
their companies. They showed inability to understand what was actually going, and 
this at times when they should have been “intelligent enough to have realised that they 
were, in the case of each company, incurring debts that in probability they would be 
unable to pay and of using for their own purposes money that ought to have been 
made over to the Crown.”70
The case Re Barings Plc & Others (No 5) 71  provides one of the most powerful 
illustrations of directors’ ignorance. As result of the unauthorised trading activities of a 
single trader, the Barings Group collapsed. The bank’s governance was characterised 
by poor delegation, inadequate supervision and a complete lack of expertise in 
derivatives. All in all, the directors “ought to have known better”.72 Warning lights were 
ignored due to the veil of ignorance that dominated their management style; had they 
paid more attention to the worrying and strong signals however, they would have been 
alerted of the banks’ financial state. Having said that, their knowledge was limited, 
superficial and totally inadequate to properly equip them for their managerial role.73
Their management style was ‘mistaken’ and ‘misguided’74 and their occasional and 
casual inquiries as to how the trader was generating his reported profits were 
unsatisfactory. Due to ignorance they lacked the incentive to spend long on key tasks, 
lacking also the motivation to scrutinise bank strategies. Their general unawareness 
of what was going on drove them to over-rely on internal advice and obtain little 
external advice, possibly because the external advice could have been contrary to the 
dominant views held within the bank. At best the directors’ style was mechanical, at 
worst simply cosmetic.75 In the end their failure to equip themselves with a good level 
of knowledge of Barings’ business matters amounted to a clear breach of their 
management duties. Justice Jonathan Parker was vigorous and emphatic in his 
conclusions: directors, he said, “have, both collectively and individually, a continuing 
duty to acquire and maintain a sufficient knowledge and understanding of the 
company’s business to enable them properly to discharge their duties as directors”. A 
70 Re Linvale [1993] BCLC 654 (ChD), 660: two directors were disqualified for five years after three successive 
companies of which they were directors, went into insolvency. 
71 Re Barings Plc & Others (No 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433. 
72 Re Barings Plc & Others (No 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433. 
73 Re Barings Plc & Others (No 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433, 528. 
74 Re Barings Plc & Others (No 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433. 
75 Howard Davies, The Financial Crisis: Who is to Blame? (Polity Press 2010) 148.
manager who does not properly appreciate the business he is expected to manage 
will be unable to take solid, informed decisions. A limited, general and superficial 
understanding is clearly insufficient.76
The matter of directors’ ignorance is reinforced in the subsections below, where two 
of the most notorious corporate scandals in modern history are examined: Northern 
Rock and Lehman brothers. Casualties of the 2008 financial crisis, the cases signifying 
concrete support for the theory of board ignorance articulated here. They have one 
crucial and fundamental element in common: their executives displayed a general lack 
of understanding of their banks’ operations. And within this environment they also 
endorsed the design of pay packages that effectively encouraged the excessive risk-
taking that we continue to deliberate upon today. 
3.2.1. An America Paradigm: Lehman Brothers - A Story of Obliviousness and 
Idiocy  
Lehman Brothers’ collapse in September 2008 marks the greatest bankruptcy in US 
history. 77 The bank went from being the fourth largest investment bank in the United 
States78 to bankruptcy in less than a year. Its failure caused the credit markets' 
disintegration, a disintegration that cascaded into the global economic crisis soon 
after. There are many ironic sides to Lehman’s story: in January 2008 the bank 
reported record revenues of nearly $60 billion and record earnings in excess of $4 
billion (for its fiscal year ending November 2007); certainly a remarkable achievement 
to the outside world. However, the façade was not to last. It transpired that the banks’ 
strategy was to invest heavily into the securities market linked to the US sub-prime 
mortgage market; that is precisely how it gained the title of Wall Street's biggest dealer
in fixed-interest trading. Soon, analysts begun to (accurately) predict that confidence 
in Lehman Brothers would evaporate, particularly after the collapse of Bear Stearns 
earlier that year. When Lehman’s investments begun experiencing rejection due to 
their high-risk nature, confidence levels significantly dropped. Eventually the bank was 
76 Re Barings Plc & Others (No 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433, 528. 
77 For an overview of its collapse, see: Anton R Valukas, Lehman Brothers Holdings inc.,et al, (Chapter 11 case 
no. 0813555 (JMP)., Vol. 1) 2010 United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York, Jenner & 
Block LLP 353, Chicago <http://jenner.com/lehman/lehman/VOLUME%201.pdf> accessed 14 April 2016. 
78 A ‘title’ held during 2007.
unable to retain the confidence of its lenders and counterparties, a loss of confidence 
that resulted in the loss of major clients (caused also by the non-transparency of its 
products), the banks’ devaluation by the credit rating agencies, and the suffering of 
gigantic losses on sub-prime mortgages. Unsurprisingly the bank’s total financial 
catastrophe followed on from that. 
While these unprecedented events were taking place, most Lehman executives had 
little appreciation of the enormity of the problems faced by Lehman. In fact they 
appeared almost oblivious to the reality of the situation. Many interesting facts 
transpired from a post-collapse report:79 for instance, the bank’s risk committee only 
held two meetings in the financial year of 2007-08. It also transpired that Fuld, one of 
the banks’ main executives, “was always more optimistic about Lehman's condition 
than the markets were”.80 Because of his ignorance of key bank transactions the bank 
routinely failed to provide enhanced disclosures about important financing 
arrangements called Repo 105 transactions. As he had little understanding of what 
they were or what they signified, he was not interested in their accounting treatment 
and therefore did not care to structure or negotiate them. When the Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform (US House of Congress) summoned Fuld to 
explain what had happened, he admitted full responsibility for the errors and 
misjudgements in the period leading up to the firm’s bankruptcy. During the 
congressional hearing he said that individuals certainly bore some of the blame but 
the circumstances were equally to blame: there were destabilising factors, rumours, 
widening credit default swap spreads, naked short-selling, attacks, credit agency 
downgrades, a loss of confidence by clients and counterparties, and strategic buyers 
sitting on the side-lines waiting for an assisted deal.81 This was all too overwhelming 
79 This is according Anton Valukas, the Court-appointed examiner: Report of Anton R Valukas, Lehman 
Brothers Holdings inc., et al, (Chapter 11 case no. 0813555 (JMP)., Vol. 1) 2010 United States Bankruptcy 
Court Southern District of New York, Jenner & Block LLP 353, Chicago 
<http://jenner.com/lehman/lehman/VOLUME%201.pdf> accessed 14 April 2016. Anton Valukas, chairman of 
the Chicago law firm Jenner & Block, was appointed by a bankruptcy court in New York in 2009 to report on 
the causes of the Lehman bankruptcy. Valukas prepared the lengthy report with other authors, detailing their 
perspectives on the workings of Lehman Brothers and possible avenues for actions against the firm’s directors
and shareholders.
80 Report of Anton R Valukas, Lehman Brothers Holdings inc., et al, (Chapter 11 case no. 0813555 (JMP)., 
Vol. 1) 2010 United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York, Jenner & Block LLP 353, 
Chicago <http://jenner.com/lehman/lehman/VOLUME%201.pdf> accessed 14 April 2016. 
81 House of Representatives, Hearing Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, The Causes 
and Effects of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy (One Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session, October 6, 
2008).
for the executives, according to Fuld. They were dazed by a series of complex 
procedures and products and by the highly technical nature of the bank’s affairs. In 
fact, the complexity of the bank’s business made it extremely hard for them to 
understand what they meant or what they were intended to mean.82
It also transpired that the dominant ‘board culture’ encouraged “delusions of 
invincibility”.83 Senior officers would make business decisions based primarily on their 
intuitive understanding of the markets than on the firm’s quantitative risk limits. Also, 
even when the bank’s financial troubles were at their most severe stage, its 
independent directors preferred to remain passive; they failed to call for an 
investigation or scrutinise the board’s finance and risk committee. Additionally, there 
was no call for a capital infusion despite the fact that one was required.84 Crucially, the 
question of qualifications came up, raising serious concerns. The bank had ten 
independent directors in its board upon its collapse; half of these directors were over 
the age of 70, and amongst these two were in their 80s. Out of the ten directors, nine 
were retirees, four were aged over 75 and one was a former Admiral who had 
previously worked in human resources. And out of all of them only two had experience 
in the financial services industry. Kaufman, an 80-year-old, chaired the board’s finance 
and risk committee and Fuld, the bank’s chief executive, served as the Chairman of 
both the board and the executive committee, alongside an 80-year-old independent 
director. Interestingly in 2009 Fuld was ranked number one on ‘The Worst American 
CEOs of All Time’ list; he was also characterised by the magazine compiling the list 
as "belligerent and unrepentant".85
3.2.2. A Paradigm from the Continent of Europe: Northern Rock - A Tail of 
Hubris, Greed and Ignorance  
82 House of Representatives, Hearing Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2008. The 
Causes and Effects of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy (One Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session, 
October 6, 2008).
83 Bob Tricker, Corporate Governance – Principles, Policies and Practices (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 
2012) 156. 
84 Bob Tricker, Corporate Governance – Principles, Policies and Practices (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 
2012) 156. 
85 Compiled by Conde Nast Portfolio: ‘Portfolio's Worst American CEOs of All Time: Dick Fuld’ Portfolio.com 
(New York, 30 April 2009) http://www.aol.com/article/2009/04/24/portfolios-best-and-worst-ceos/1527066/
accessed 23 May 2016.
The collapse of Northern Rock constitutes the first UK casualty of the 2008 financial 
crisis; it is also a metaphor for the breakdown of corporate governance in modern 
times. This is yet another story of hubris and greed, and of bankers ignorantly believing 
that their ‘clever’ new financial ways can free them from the dull realities of everyday 
economic life. It is also a story of poor understanding and pure ignorance. Northern 
Rocks’ problems were primarily caused by three key factors: its speedy growth 
powered by forceful lending to somewhat uninformed borrowers, the absence of 
proper supervision by the Financial Services Authority, and the tolerant environment 
that prevailed at the time, of lax bank safety rules and lax regulation. 86 This tolerant 
atmosphere was exploited by the bank, eventually finding itself with no reserves to 
protect itself against unforeseen losses.87 More specifically, approximately ten years 
before its eventual catastrophe, the bank, whilst manipulating loosening regulation, 
began to borrow heavily on the wholesale financial markets in order to fund up to 125% 
mortgages. Of course it did so with the approval of the City of London. At that stage 
Northern Rock’s share price increased to levels no one could have anticipated.88 But 
following the decline of the US subprime mortgage market, the mortgage securitisation 
market also suffered a decline. As a result Northern Rock found itself unable to raise 
the funds needed to continue with its day-to-day operations. Desperate for help, it was 
granted liquidity support from the Bank of England as lender of last resort. Yet still, 
once the public became aware of the catastrophic events, it was too late to save the 
bank; there was a crisis of confidence and a complete loss of trust, resulting in the first 
bank run in 150 years.89
86 Note that in the wake of the financial crisis, the Financial Services Act of 2012 set out a new system for 
regulating financial services in the UK. The current regulatory model transfers the responsibilities of the former 
FSA to two new bodies, the ‘Prudential Regulation Authority’ (PRA) and the ‘Financial Conduct Authority’ 
(FCA). The FCA, which regulates banks, building societies, insurers, independent financial advisers, mutual 
societies and investment managers and stockbrokers, is responsible for ensuring conduct and markets regulation 
is stricter and more involved with consumers.
87 According to an FSA internal audit, the bank’s supervisors met Rock staff just seven times in the 18 months 
before the run, and failed to question its aggressive growth targets and reliance on wholesale funding. Financial 
Services Authority, The Supervision of Northern Rock: A Lessons Learnt Review (Internal Audit Division 
Report, 2008) <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/nr_report.pdf.> accessed 15 April 2016. Also, see Brooke 
Masters, ‘Northern Rock Exposed Regulatory Failings’ Financial Times (London, 12 September 2012) 16. Also 
see Joanna Gray and Orkun Akseli (eds), Financial Regulation in Crisis? (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2011) 
56. Northern Rock’s run was the first run an English bank since Overend Gurney in 1866.
88 Giles Frazer, ‘If the Northern Rock Fiasco was a Morality Tale, it was More About Hubris Than Greed’ The 
Guardian (London, 14 September 2012) 12. 
89 Due to the severity of the situation the UK Treasury, to bring an end to the panic, agreed to protect all bank’s 
deposits as well as all new retain deposits as well. Five months after the end of the run, Northern Rock was 
nationalised.
The report published on the collapse of Northern Rock (by the Treasury Committee of 
the UK House of Commons) concluded that a general culture of recklessness and 
irresponsibility dominated the bank; so much so in fact, that strong warning signals 
pointing to the bank’s vulnerability were largely ignored. To start with, the report noted 
that the rate of growth of the bank itself was unhealthy and unrealistic. The steep drop 
in the bank’s share price (especially compared to other banks) was also abnormal, 
normally indicative of the fact that the strategy is ‘high-risk’ and the funding policies, 
reckless and inappropriate.90 Yet, despite the numerous warning signals, the bank’s 
top people were ‘asleep at the wheel’ in the run up to the collapse. Crucially, they failed 
to take steps to ensure the bank remained liquid as well as solvent. They failed to 
insure the bank against its own risky schemes and speculations, failing also to act as 
a restraining force against the risky strategies taken by other executive members.91
Remarkably, they had little appreciation of the nature of their actual job: the level of 
supervision performed by the board of directors in monitoring the bank’s financial 
condition was poor, and the degree of insurance and cover against the bank’s risky 
strategies was negligible - they even opted out of organising a standby facility or cover 
for the risks assumed by the bank. All in all there was ‘ambiguity and confusion’ 
regarding the ownership of risks associated with off balance sheet vehicles, an 
ambiguity that played a crucial part in the market’s instability.92 Eventually Northern 
Rock was unable to protect itself against the significant liquidity pressures it 
encountered following the freezing of the international capital markets in August 2007. 
Within this environment there was a general absence of knowledge and experience 
by the executives: for example prior to the bank’s collapse the board made two crucial 
appointments to the positions of Chairman and Chief Executive despite the 
appointees’ obvious lack of qualifications, banking training or financial expertise.93
90 House of Commons Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock. (HC 56–I, Fifth Report of Session 2007-08) –
Report, Together with Formal Minutes London: TSO (The Stationery Office), 16-18, 23. 
91 House of Commons Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock. (HC 56–I, Fifth Report of Session 2007-08) –
Report, Together with Formal Minutes London: TSO (The Stationery Office), 19. 
92 House of Commons, Treasury Committee, Financial Stability and Transparency. (HC 371, Sixth Report of 
Session 2007-08) - Report, Together with Formal Minutes London: TSO (The Stationery Office), p. 77. Also 
see Roman Tomasic, ‘Corporate Rescue, Governance and Risk Taking in Northern Rock: Part 2’ [2008] 29
Company Lawyer 330, 331.
93 This is according to the report ‘The Run on The Rock’: House of Commons Treasury Committee, The Run on 
the Rock. (HC 56–I, Fifth Report of Session 2007-08) – Report, Together with Formal Minutes London: TSO 
(The Stationery Office).
4. Back to Basics: Educating Bankers on the Law, Ethics and Social Values 
Markets lie at the heart of every prosperous economy but markets do not function well 
on their own; governments play a role in regulating markets to avert the kinds of 
failures experienced in 2008. The role of the market as a tool for controlling behaviour 
is limited. That being said, conventional methods toward law and regulation are fairly 
unproductive in adjusting the social costs of market failure. One way forward is 
increased regulation, for instance regulation restricting or inhibiting the use of over-
the-counter derivatives for banks.94 But law and regulation alone are incapable of 
providing whole solutions to the breakdown in management performance. They are 
incapable of reacting fast enough to tackle the potential harms that might derive from 
innovative financial ideas such collateralized debt obligations and derivative securities; 
certainly the many failures and scandals resulting from the 2008 financial crisis are 
indicative of that law adherence does not automatically result in acceptable and ethical 
behaviour. But here is the difficulty: things cannot just improve with a simple 
observance of the law.95 Yet, when there is huge discontent of companies for their 
disregard of corporate social responsibility how can large businesses alter decades of 
practices in favour of methods that are more fitting and ethical? The question therefore 
is where else to turn to when both markets and law are incapable of accomplishing 
their social promise.96
If regulation and restructuring were to work, the way bankers do business would need 
to change. Bankers would need to alter the way they understand their jobs, particularly 
the consequences of creating and encouraging excessive risk-taking, and of 
generating high debts whilst imposing excessive transaction costs. This would involve 
retuning their professional values to bring them more in line with their personal 
choices. This is a crucial step, particularly in light of studies pointing to behavioral 
weaknesses and ignorance of the effects of widespread methods such as 
94 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Regulation and Failure’ in David Moss and John Cisternino (eds), New Perspectives on 
Regulation (The Tobin Project 2009) 15.
95 For an interesting discussion on codes of ethics, see: Trish Keeper, ‘Codes of Ethics and Corporate 
Governance – a Study of New Zealand Listed Companies’ in P.M. Vasudev, Susan Watson (eds), Corporate 
Governance After the Financial Crisis (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2012) 271. Also, see Muel Kaptein and 
Johan Wempe, The Balanced Company: A Theory of Corporate Intergrity (Oxford University Press 2002).
96 A question also addressed by: Dan Awrey, William Blair and David Kershaw, ‘Between Law and Markets: Is 
There a Role for Culture and Ethics in Financial Regulation?.’ (LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 14/2012, 2012) <http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm> accessed 12 March 2016.
securitization and short-termism. In this regard education is a solid measure,
especially the type that highlights the positives of corporate social responsibility and 
sustainability. The type that teaches or reminds one (whichever one applies) of what 
the law actually says: that it is perfectly fine to be more inclusive during the decision-
making process;97 that having a long-term collective outlook is perfectly acceptable
too. That section 172 of the Companies Act 2006, enacted to eradicate short-termism,
does in fact encourage management to care about a firm’s long-term sustainable 
growth.98 In this regard, education is a useful tool specifically before one assumes a 
leadership position.99 And what of the bigger picture? It is to help restructure and 
correct principles and ideals. Otherwise, executives will continue to seek ways around 
new rules, profit maximization being their main goal, and all the while acting in a way 
that is at best ignorant of consequences and at worst self-serving and dishonest – both 
being a serious threat to a firm’s sustainability, and even to bankers’ personal well-
being.100 Perhaps the key here is to seek mundane solutions than multifaceted ones; 
even to complex matters such as these simplicity might after all, work best.
4.1. The Splendour of Educating Bankers on Law and Other Matters: A Simple 
(Yet Powerful) Measure  
97 Demetra Arsalidou, ‘Shareholders and Corporate Scrutiny: the Role of the UK Stewardship Code’ [2012] 9(3) 
European Company and Financial Law Review 342.  
98 Particularly sections 172 and 417 Companies Act 2006. 
<http://www.law.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/events/directors-duties/keay-the-duty-to-promote-the-
success.pdf> accessed 16 April 2016, 31. 
99 Also important is training, and a meaningful tool after one assumes a leadership position. Investment bankers 
receive a large part of their training through their employer. Currently, there are numerous training requirements. 
New trainees must complete the training and exams provided by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), a 
regulatory requirement for anyone working in investment banking in the UK. New trainees are normally 
introduced to the sector via intensive company induction programmes, which may last four to eight weeks. 
Training programs tend to focus on areas such as risk, markets, accounting, financial statement analysis, and 
financial modelling, corporate finance, economics and capital markets. Senior professionals from within the 
company, as well as industry experts deliver these programmes. They are designed to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the particular sector(s). Induction programmes bring together new trainees from across the 
organisation. The focus is on team building and case-study-based learning. Once inductions are completed, 
additional training may be provided through in-house courses and seminars and working alongside those already 
established in the role. Additionally, there are employers who ask for additional professional qualifications. Many 
are available: for instance the Chartered Institute for Securities & Investment (CISI) provides a number of 
qualifications related to the work of investment bankers, which are approved by the FSA. Importantly corporate 
investment bankers, on the successful completion of their initial certificates they can proceed with the undertaking 
of further professional development, for instance by reading for the global qualification called the Corporate 
Finance Qualification, a qualification provided by ICAEW, i.e. the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales. There are more training courses for anyone wishing to do even more, provided by the Chartered 
Financial Analyst Society of the UK, and The Association of Corporate Treasurers. 
100 A banker has little personal benefit in acting carelessly: the poor performance of functions can result in job 
losses, loss of credibility and damage to an individual’s reputation.
Let us begin with posing a question. What do the following have in common: the 
collapse of Northern Rock in the UK, the catastrophic events of Fortis Bank in Belgium, 
and the Lehman brothers’ fiasco in the US? All reflect serious problems underlying 
bankers’ behaviour and attitudes. Cases such as Northern Rock, Fortis and Lehman 
Brothers might be commonplace but their commonality does not make them any the 
less disturbing; the opposite in fact. What is troubling is that they should not have 
gotten so bad. Executives appeared unable to appreciate their firms’ strategies; they 
were consequently unable to manage their resultant risks. On the one hand the market 
conditions were hard. Yet, the banks’ practices and products were so complex that 
even their own executives had difficulty understanding what they actually meant. They 
seemed incapable of appreciating that these business models were based on faulty 
value-at-risk and that they had the potential to drive their banks to total failure or near-
collapse. In their state of ignorance executives gave way to unreasonable 
compensation packages which incentivised the pursuing of short-term profits; profits
that were reliant on excessively risky behaviour. Through obliviousness they increased
systemic risk in the financial system minimising their banks’ profitability in the 
process.101 But why were directors so confused of their obligations and expectations?
What were the reasons for their (often detrimental) actions? Numerous as they were, 
behavioural limitations and ignorance lay at the core. Take Barings for example: the 
directors’ breach of duty involved not so much discrete failures of management but 
more a general failure to manage; not so much bad management as to non-
management. 102 Or in Northern Rock the executives appeared incapable of
appreciating the complexities of the bank’s business strategy – that it was too reckless 
and high risk. That put them in a weak position, making them unable to properly 
supervise the own bank’s operations.103 In Citigroup one executive famously declared 
that “as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance”,104 and in HBOS 
a former chief executive looked back on his record upon his departure and said “now 
101 House of Commons, Treasury Committee, Banking Crisis: Regulation and Supervision (HC 767, Fourteenth 
Report of Session 2008-09) – Report, Together with Formal Minutes London: TSO (The Stationery Office), 
evidence 57.
102 Re Barings Plc & Others (No 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433, at 483.
103 House of Commons Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock. (HC 56–I, Fifth Report of Session 2007-08) 
– Report, Together with Formal Minutes London: TSO (The Stationery Office), 3.
104 Michiyo Nakamoto and David Wighton, ‘Bullish Citigroup is ‘Still Dancing’ to the Beat of the Buy-Out 
Boom’ Financial Times (London 10 July 2007) 12. 
that I know what I know, I wish I’d been bolder”. 105 The behavioural bias of 
overconfidence is openly demonstrated in these cases. 
Here is the difficulty: the world has come to accept that the value of what bankers do
is defined by the market. If the market tolerates a certain type of behavior, if such 
behavior is legal, no other test of properness can be relevant. Moreover, when 
executives and banks think of progress they only mean financial progress, and the 
measure of that is today’s share price; this is still the case despite the shock the 
financial world has experienced in 2008. But as we learn from the global financial
catastrophe this is not always so. And as we also learn, many times management 
failures stem from a basic misconception on the directors’ part of the extent of their 
management responsibilities. That bankers underestimated the risks involved to such 
a degree as to cause the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression is partly 
the result of ignorance and behavioural limitations. It appears that possessing an in-
depth understanding of today’s complex business structures is beyond the ability of 
many; consequently, they would rather refrain from scrutinising and challenging 
decisions preferring to function as members of a cosy club instead.106 But how can 
they ever do a good job if they do not appreciate the intricacies involved? How can 
they do justice to their profession if they are subject to behavioural limitations that
restrict their abilities to function as expected? 
After the worldwide recession at the end of the last decade, some, rightly or wrongly, 
assigned responsibility at business schools for failing to instill the significance of 
corporate social values on to their students. Financial models and financial theories 
were heavily criticised, but so were business schools for having had a negative 
influence on executives’ style of management. This is particularly so with regards to 
the US business schools (although not exclusively).107 Business schools have not 
been tough enough to offer graduates the ammunition needed to ensure temptations 
and unreasonable risks are avoided. Research conducted by the Association of MBA’s 
105 As stated by senior banker, James Crosby: see James Croft, ‘Sir James Leaves HBOS on a High Note’
Financial Times (London, 28 July 2006) 8. 
106 House of Commons, Treasury Committee, Banking Crisis, Reforming Corporate Governance and Pay in the 
City. (HC 519, Ninth Report of Session 2008–09) - Report, Together with Formal Minutes London: TSO (The 
Stationery Office).
107 Howard Davies, The Financial Crisis: Who is to Blame? (Polity Press 2010) 191; Demetra Arsalidou, 
Rethinking Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions (Routledge 2015).
indicates that only 20% of MBA courses incorporate a compulsory corporate social 
responsibility module in their syllabuses. 108  Unlike other subjects such as arts, 
philosophy and history, business schools do not help students develop skills such as 
critical thinking and moral reasoning. 109  Interestingly, according to an online poll 
conducted by the Harvard Business Review, two out of three respondents consider 
business schools partially responsible for the absence of ethical values amongst 
graduates.110 In fact, to many critics this is one of the reasons MBA-holders take short-
sighted and self-serving decisions.111 Short-term performance remains the priority of 
the majority, a type of mentality that does not exclusively originate in company 
boardrooms; from an early stage candidates are taught to focus on short-term returns; 
indeed, it is argued that business schools exaggerate the importance of short-term 
returns and by doing so they inadvertently disregard ethical principles.112 But not only 
that: they also disregard the true sense of the law. These observations are important, 
especially in light of studies suggesting that undergraduate and graduate training, and 
undergraduate degrees from best-in-class institutions are linked to better company 
performance.113 Also, it appears that what one learns in school and university can 
become obsolete within years after graduation;114 however this is interpreted, it cannot 
108 Association of MBAs Publications, <http://www.mbaworld.com/en/Evidence-and-Ideas/Publications.aspx> 
accessed 21 May 2016. Also see Adam James, ‘Academies of the Apocalypse?’ The Guardian (London, 7 April
2009) 10. James explains that a US website characterized business schools the ‘academies of the apocalypse’, 
naming and shaming numerous international prestigious MBAs and some of their graduates. For instance, it 
named Harvard MBA graduate Henry Paulson, who was Secretary of the Treasury under President Bush and 
who was against government regulation of Wall Street and the then HBOS chief executive, Andy Hornsby.
109 Harvard Business Review, The Buck Stops (and Starts) at Business Schools (Harvard Business Review June 
2009) <https://hbr.org/2009/06/the-buck-stops-and-starts-at-business-school>.
110 Harvard Business Review, The Buck Stops (and Starts) at Business Schools (Harvard Business Review June 
2009) <https://hbr.org/2009/06/the-buck-stops-and-starts-at-business-school>; Also see Howard Davies, The 
Financial Crisis: Who is to Blame? (Polity Press 2010) 192.
111 Harvard Business Review, The Buck Stops (and Starts) at Business Schools (Harvard Business Review June 
2009) <https://hbr.org/2009/06/the-buck-stops-and-starts-at-business-school>.
112 Howard Davies, The Financial Crisis: Who is to Blame? (Polity Press 2010) 175. Also, it is interesting to 
note that MBA candidates choosing to specialise in CSR report that they are either made fun of, or face long 
pauses and blank faces when announcing their specialization to others according to research conducted by
Forbes magazine: ‘Ah the Eco Warriors’ (Forbes Magazine, 23 March 2011) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2011/03/28/does-an-mba-in-csr-devalue-your-resume/#3d1eb9d12c6d
113 For instance see the research conducted by Carola Frydman, How to Optimize Company Performance
<http://www.clomedia.com/2013/04/01/how-to-optimize-company-performance> accessed 22 May 2016. Also 
see Claire A Hill and Brett H McDonnell (eds), Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law
(Edward Elgar, 2012).
114 As noted by Stiglitz in an interview with the Yale School of Management: Jeffrey E Garten, Interview with 
Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Laureate, University Professor Columbia University, Yale School of Management (Yale, 
17 February 2014). Also, one interesting way forward is presented by Orts: Orts points to the fact that in the US, 
for-profit corporate executives and directors are counseled to consider ethical matters carefully, ethical matters 
that reasonably considered as necessary to the proper management / handling of business. They are also counseled 
to dedicate a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, educational, and humanitarian aims. What the UK 
be right particularly post-2008. At least implicitly a hands-off attitude to education and 
training encourages bankers to evade responsibility. The matter is simple therefore: 
we must no longer put up with crusty old degree programmes that have lost their 
relevance to the modern world. 
Evidently education does play its role in the failure of bankers to act with ethos and 
social responsibility. Whatever the evidence however, this subject spawns difficulties 
and controversies with respect to the responses, at least in part because it is hard for 
people to wrap their minds around the notion of education as a solution. For many, the 
facts on the ground do not yet support such a simple approach. There are those caught 
up in the idea that measures have to be really tough and that education is not a strong 
tool; meanwhile, one of many hindrances to such an approach is that university 
degrees might pose an obstacle from any attempt to implicate them. But this is the 
time that universities need to ‘take one for the team’. The path of renewal has to start 
with acknowledging that there is a powerful moral dimension to what has happened, 
and to learn about this moral dimension education is the most efficient tool, certainly
before one assumes an executive role. Corporate social responsibility is about 
personal values of trust, ethics and accountability; it is not about having no business 
sense. Future leaders need to be educated to the extent that they understand that as 
guardians of great public interest, what they choose to do can (and does) result in 
severe societal implications. As a former executive of HSBC once said, “one of the 
most obvious and commonplace manifestations of the tendency to compartmentalize 
is seeing our work as being a neutral realm in which questions of value, other than 
shareholder value, or rightness, other than what is lawful, need not arise. 
Compartmentalization is employed because it helps to shut out the difficult questions 
that trouble our conscience.” 115 Future leaders need to appreciate that good 
leadership is not just about rewards – it is about a leader’s responsibilities towards a 
firm’s stakeholders. That the traditional educational system is not up to the task can 
does is to insert s. 172, explain it, and to require directors ‘to act fairly’ as well as to maintain “a reputation for 
high standards of business conduct”: As Orts explains, at least to a degree, these provisions are meant to help 
promote firms to care about hybrid social purposes in their decisions. However, it is crucial to train directors to 
understand what s.172 really says: Eric W Orts, Business Persons – A Legal Theory of the Firm (Oxford 
University Press 2013), 112. 
115 As found in Bert van de Ven, ‘Banking after the Crisis: Towards an Understanding of Banking as a 
Professional Practice’ [2011] 18 Ethical Perspectives, 541.
no longer be acceptable, particularly as the complexity of the modern economy 
requires nonstop learning for new responsibilities and tasks. 
Nonetheless, this debate is not merely about how ethos matters in banking. It is also 
about misconceptions – pure and simple. In the modern investment environment 
investors engage in short-term trading strategies rather than long-term goals and their 
portfolio choices are based on immediate returns.116 There is evidence in fact, of 
investors majoring on short-term benefits.117 Still, this does not mean that executives 
must act accordingly, nor does it mean that if they choose not to, they will inevitably 
be in breach of their duties. And precisely this is a key issue here: there is a general 
lack of awareness of what the law actually says. Certainly as fiduciaries directors are
already required to act with honesty, integrity and ethos throughout their careers; this 
is already instilled in law. But the law also tells management to be more inclusive in 
their decision-making and to consider a firm’s long-term sustainable growth;118 it tells 
them that they are to benefit the members whilst taking into account the relationship 
of the company with other stakeholders. This is under section 172 of the Companies 
Act 2006, intended to prevail over the focus on short-termism whilst encouraging firms 
to have a greater long-term outlook and to care more about hybrid social purposes.119
The overreaching duty of directors is to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members as a whole and in doing so, they should take into account 
(amongst other matters) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term.120
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Directors are not merely morally inclined to adhere to s.172 – its approach endorses 
the long-established principle in Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd121 that a company 
is not distinct from its shareholders; rather, the ‘best interests of the company’ are 
equated with the collective interests of the shareholders. Future bankers must be 
educated to the full effect of the law: that the consideration of interests other than those 
of shareholders is not a mere idealistic or impractical notion from which nothing 
concrete can emerge. Increased shareholder value should be one of the by-products 
and not the top priority of directors. Although the language of section 172 is ripe for 
interpretation, ‘the devil is in the detail’. Despite pressures faced, focusing on the long-
term than the short-term stock price performance is perfectly legitimate, particularly 
post-2008. 122 Crucially, once the fixation with increasing shareholder value is 
substituted with the true goal behind section 172, the short-term rewards, used to
incentivize managers to manage short-term expectations, will gradually fade. This is 
an attractive and innovative approach that must be celebrated, not overlooked; it is an 
approach that can actually increase the overall competitiveness, wealth and welfare 
for all.123
Furthermore, future executives must learn about the numerous behavioural limitations 
that can potentially constrain their ability to do a good job: overconfidence and over-
optimism being key traits. Studies also point to heuristics, defined as mental shortcuts 
used to simplify or even oversimplify decisions taken under uncertainty.124 It is vital 
they learn that decisions can often depart from the image of rational utility maximizers 
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that neoclassical economics has designed for market participants. Business education 
must not turn a blind eye to the boundaries of human rationality; boundaries that can 
lead to the bubbles and bursts witnessed in the past few years. By learning about the 
behavioural flaws that are potentially awaiting them, executives can be better prepared 
to function in the world of finance. This will help them obtain a better understanding of 
strategies, monitor management better, improve on their skills and have more restraint 
in their actions. This is particularly important as post-crisis research signifies the poor 
judgment and unfamiliarity shown by executives regarding their business’s financial 
nuances and related risks. 125
Education is also a cost-efficient way to reduce the so-called ‘agency costs’; these are 
costs that arise each time a director pursues his or her own agenda at the expense of 
the company. The greater the complexity of the functions assumed by the agent and 
the greater the discretion vested in the agent, the higher these agency costs are likely 
to be.126 In a public lecture Hoffmann L.J. stressed the need to ensure such costs are 
controlled in the most efficient way, as the success of the management of the 
company, depends upon, among other things, the control of such costs.127 Since 
agency costs are factored into the price that investors are willing to pay for shares, 
firms are keen to reduce such costs in order to increase the price eventually paid by 
investors.128 Paradoxically, the reduction of such costs can actually benefit the agents 
as much as the principals; this is because the principal will be willing to offer greater 
compensation to an agent if the principal is convinced that the agent is trustworthy and 
honest.129 Therefore, directors must learn that there are huge benefits in reducing
agency costs; essentially any reduction, no matter how small, can help diminish the 
divergence of interests typically present between firms and managers.
125 Emilios Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial Markets – the Law, the Economics, the Politics
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 121. For an excellent review of these biases, see Thomas Gilovich, Dale 
Griffin and Daniel Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Cambridge 
University Press 2002). Also, see S Trevis Certo, Brian L Connelly and Laszlo Tihanyi, ‘Managers and Their 
not-so Rational Decisions’ [2008] 51 Business Horizons 113. This is unlike the approach followed by many 
economists, referred to as ‘neo-classical purists’.
126 John Armour et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law (OUP 2009) 35.
127 The Rt Hon. Lord Hoffmann, ‘The Fourth Annual Leonard Sainer Lecture: The Rt Hon Lord Hoffmann’ 
[1997] 18 Company Lawyer 194. 
128 Eilis Ferran, Company Law and Corporate Finance (OUP 1999) 118; Demetra Arsalidou, ‘The Regulation of 
Executive Pay and Economic Theory’ [2011] 5 Journal of Business Law 431, 437. 
129 John Armour et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law (OUP 2009) 36. Also see Demetra Arsalidou, ‘The 
Regulation of Executive Pay and Economic Theory’ [2011] 5 Journal of Business Law 431, 437. 
On a positive note, there is anecdotal evidence that the role of corporate social 
responsibility on MBA programs is growing. In our ‘post-global crisis era’ this is 
certainly encouraging. Themes and ideas that were on the fringes have now entered 
the education arena and with any luck will not disappear if and when opposition rallies 
against them. This is happening at Harvard and elsewhere, where task forces have 
been established to ascertain problems and suggest ways to improve matters in 
business schools. For instance, a post-crisis task force has been established by 
London’s Cass Business School130 to evaluate the content of all its courses, both at 
the undergraduate and postgraduate level. 131 There are further promising
developments: for example the accreditation projects manager of the Association of 
MBA degrees (AMBA) has emphasised the need to change the way MBAs are taught 
in business schools. 132 He also said that that accredited MBA programs must adopt 
social and ethical issues in their syllabuses, although he fell short of specifying how 
this can be achieved. Or the deputy director of the International Centre for Corporate 
Social Responsibility at Nottingham Business School emphasising the growing 
demand for specialist Corporate Social Responsibilities MBAs, also suggesting this is
attributable to the rising significance of ethical issues at board and executive level.133
Interestingly all of the Centre’s seven core MBA courses are ethics-based; they focus
on the theoretical and practical framework of corporate social responsibility, and the 
different ways of conducting a business – such as increased sustainable growth, social 
capital and sustainable energy production. At Haas School of Business at the 
University of California, Berkeley MBA students run their own ‘socially responsive’ 
investment fund. Even the QS Global has developed a ranking in 2016 for business 
schools that ‘properly’ address ethics and CSR in their curriculum. 134 Lancaster 
University Management School went a little further, turning a corporate social 
130 The task force is called ‘The Business Ethics Teaching and Learning Task Force’.
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responsibility elective module into a compulsory module and renaming it ‘global 
society and responsible management’.135 Interesting too is George Soros’ donation of 
$50 million to support an ‘Institute of New Economic Thinking’, established to promote 
an overhaul of economic teaching and research.136 Moreover, business schools all 
over the UK, such as Amba and Durham Business School, are actively collecting data 
on the question of corporate social ethics; in fact, according to the Durham survey, 
eight out of 10 of the 500 graduates questioned believe that ethics are more weighty 
post-crisis. 137  The studies also point to the growing recognition that ethics and 
corporate social responsibility necessitate a more prominent position within MBA 
degrees.138
Let us be clear here: no one is suggesting that business schools are to blame for the 
economic crises or the deficiencies in executive behaviour. The individuals alone are 
responsible, not the schools that train them.139 In the spirit of fighting back banks are 
constantly running campaigns to convince the public that they are not as materialistic 
or evil as portrayed by the media.140 Still, business education must not suffer from 
apathy. It must motivate reflection upon the implications of one’s actions. By changing 
the direction of business education we can teach future leaders a thing or two: that it 
is not only the most lucrative decisions that matter but also the ones that bring long-
term success; that the commitment to pursue broader social goals is not merely a 
‘hippy’ and meaningless idea: it is in fact perfectly lawful and very significant. That 
management is there to represent the interests of the whole group; otherwise the 
ideology of section 172 is simply ignored.141 Statistics amply demonstrate the potency 
of the idea that future directors need better training and education; indeed, restoring 
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faith through education can bring financial benefits to a large firm, for example an 
increase in share price could result. A rising generation of new thinkers across the 
globe will profit from this crucial, yet simple breakthrough. 
5. Conclusions 
It would be a mistake to suppose that the 2008 crisis was solely caused by the 
problematic investment decisions of large firms in purchasing mortgage-backed 
securities. It would also be a mistake to say it was caused by the poor decisions or the 
corruption involved in issuing these mortgages; after all, a “certain degree of 
corruption, manipulation and opportunism is built in to financial capitalism”.142 We have 
been spending too much time looking at the reasons the crisis happened and despite 
the apparent progress, puzzling questions remain; for instance, how were bankers 
even allowed to practice the method of securitisation? Certainly the behaviour of 
bankers has become the one challenge to the political legitimacy of the market 
economy itself.143 The banking world needs a radical change if it is to become more 
effective and more accountable.
It is said that a near-death experience pushes one to reconsider ideals and 
significances. The near-death experience of the global economy revealed not only 
weaknesses in the prevailing economic model but also weaknesses in our society.144
Given what the economy has been through, there is still a significant difference 
between the rhetoric of corporate governance and the reality. The rhetoric states that
any corporate governance improvements are by their nature, expensive and 
complicated. But straightforward approaches are there for all to see. Start with 
education. In our private lives education and ethics play a vital role. So why is the 
absence of ethical education acceptable in business? Essentially the design of the 
education system bears a lot of the blame – it is not up to the task. Yet, some might 
argue that education cannot have a great effect on management performance given 
the complexities of the financial world. That argument misses the point. Education is 
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not a mere exercise in futility and here is why: effective risk-takers, whether in business 
or elsewhere, are widely admired but not those who assume excessive and ill-advised 
risks. Education is needed to push management to price risk efficiently so as to cover 
both the private costs that such risk-taking poses to bank shareholders and the social 
costs for the broader economy in the event of a bank failure.145 Educational progress 
must lean towards a moral centre that cares about both economic and social 
responsibilities. Executives must be educated on what they can and cannot do by law: 
they must learn that there is no true conflict of interest between the case for a social 
approach and the law. They must also learn about their behavioural limitations and 
their effect on current and future performance. They must also realise that banks can 
suffer massive losses due to poor judgment and unfamiliarity of financial nuances and 
related risks.146 Ultimately, there is strong case for committing to education. And for 
this to work it must be rigorous, challenging and comprehensive. Society has suffered 
in the past from the absence of such a perspective.
It is wrong for materialism to overshadow moral obligation, and for profit to be almost 
exclusively short-term. Societies have always understood the human spirit is not 
satisfied by material progress alone; it seems that somehow this has been overlooked
by the educational system. This is the epoch to change attitudes. Business schools 
must teach that ethics and morals are indispensable ingredients of leadership; while 
this cannot guarantee results, the real threat to financial stability – the human factor –
can be somewhat confronted and controlled. It is possible that with the crisis’ aftermath 
still going strong we are finally ready to change our tone. Yes, there will always be 
areas of disappointment – but if we attempt the simple tasks first, we might just find 
we are heading in the right direction. If we cannot tackle these issues persuasively 
now, then the ambiguity will remain, and that will signal more trouble.
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